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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 06-4641
_______________
ANN G. JOHNSON,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 05-cv-04059)
District Judge: Honorable Mary Little Cooper
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 7, 2008
Before: FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
and O’NEILL*, District Judge.
(Filed: January 28, 2008)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
_______________
*Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr., United States District Court Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

Ann G. Johnson appeals the order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and denying her application
for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. Johnson alleges
that the District Court erred in finding that substantial evidence supported the
Commissioner’s decision that Johnson was not disabled from June 20, 2000 (her alleged
disability onset date) through March 25, 2005 (the date of the ALJ’s decision denying
benefits). Specifically, Johnson alleges that the ALJ failed to sufficiently explain why he
concluded that Johnson’s impairments did not meet or equal the requirements in the
Listing of Impairments, Appendix 1 to Subpart P, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, that the ALJ lacked
an evidentiary basis for his assessment of Johnson’s residual functional capacity, and that
he improperly evaluated Johnson’s subjective complaints. For the following reasons, we
will affirm the District Court’s decision.
I.

Background
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we set forth only those

facts pertinent to the issues before us on appeal. Johnson filed a claim for SSI on June 20,
2000, and applied for DIB on December 11, 2002. She claimed that she stopped working
on December 29, 1999, and became unable to work because of her disabilities on June 1,
2000. Johnson stated that her ability to work is limited by back and neck pain resulting

2

from multiple car accidents and two spinal fusions. She claims that the pain prevents her
from lifting, bending, sitting, reaching and walking for “any length of time.”
Johnson’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. She filed a
request for a hearing before an ALJ, which resulted in the issuance of an Order of
Dismissal due to her failure to appear at the hearing. She then filed a request for review
with the Appeals Council, and the Council vacated and remanded the matter to the ALJ.
After a hearing on December 8, 2004, the ALJ issued a decision on March 25, 2005,
finding that Johnson was not disabled1 under the Act, and therefore, not entitled to DIB or
SSI.2 Johnson appealed the decision to the Appeals Council, but it denied her request for
review on June 17, 2005. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision denying benefits was adopted
as the Commissioner’s final decision. On appeal, the District Court affirmed the
Commissioner’s denial of Johnson’s claim. Johnson timely appealed to this Court.
II.

Discussion3

1

Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical and mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). In order to be disabled,
an individual’s “physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
[the individual] is not only unable to do his [or her] previous work but cannot,
considering his [or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ... .” 42 U.S.C. § 423
(d)(2)(A).
2

The ALJ did, however, find that Johnson met the nondisability requirements set forth
in Section 216(I) of the Act to receive DIB through March 25, 2005.
3

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A District Court’s review of the
3

An ALJ must engage in a five-step sequential evaluation process in determining
whether a person is disabled under the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4). The first step
requires that the individual not be gainfully employed. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(I).
The second step requires that the individual’s impairments qualify as “severe.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(ii). The third step requires that the individual’s impairments meet or
equal one of the listings in Appendix 1 and the duration requirement. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(iii). The fourth step is an assessment of the claimant’s residual
functional capacity, which includes an inquiry into whether the claimant can perform her
past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(iv). The fifth step involves an analysis
of whether the claimant, taking into consideration her residual functional capacity, age,
education and work experience, can make an adjustment to other work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(v).
In conducting the five-step evaluation, the ALJ first found that Johnson was not
gainfully employed. Second, he found Johnson’s impairments of chronic back pain
syndrome and chronic low back pain syndrome to be severe. Third, the ALJ concluded
that Johnson’s impairments did not meet the specific criteria of any impairment in the

Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits is limited to determining whether the
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We also
examine the record to determine whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). In Social Security cases,
we have defined “substantial evidence” as “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)).
4

Listing of Impairments, Appendix 1 to Subpart P, 20 C.F.R. § 404. Fourth, in
consideration of the medical records, Johnson’s testimony, Johnson’s symptoms,
Johnson’s subjective complaints and Johnson’s daily activities and restrictions, the ALJ
found that Johnson did not retain the residual functional capacity to perform the
requirements of her past occupation. Fifth, in consideration of her residual functional
capacity, age, education, relevant past work experience, and the vocational expert’s
testimony, the ALJ concluded that Johnson was capable of performing a wide range of
sedentary work and was, therefore, not disabled.
A.

Sufficiency of ALJ’s Explanation at Third Step of Disability Evaluation

Johnson first alleges that the ALJ erred in failing to provide sufficient explanation
for his conclusion that her impairments do not satisfy any of the Listings at step three of
the sequential evaluation, and that his finding that she did not meet or equal Listing 1.04
was erroneous. As the District Court ruled, the ALJ did provide sufficient explanation for
his finding, and there was substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that
Johnson failed to meet or equal Listing 1.04.
Johnson specifically contends that the ALJ erred by failing to (1) describe the
requirements of the listings used to analyze her claim, (2) explain why he chose to
analyze her claim under those listings, and (3) explain why her impairments did not meet
the requirements of those listings. Contrary to Johnson’s argument, the ALJ provided
sufficient explanation for his conclusion that Johnson was not disabled. As we stated in
Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004), there is no particular language or
5

format that an ALJ must use in his or her analysis as long as there is “sufficient
development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” In
this case, the ALJ’s opinion not only sets forth the facts used in rendering his decision,
but it also provides a thorough examination of the medical evidence.
The ALJ stated that he considered Listings 1.00 ff. and 11.00 ff., paying particular
attention to Listings 1.04 and 11.18, which deal with spinal disorders and cerebral trauma,
respectively. He undertook a detailed analysis of Johnson’s medical history, according
weight to Johnson’s subjective complaints as well as to the opinions of her physicians and
the state agency medical consultants. The ALJ then found that Johnson’s testimony
regarding her impairments was not credible because “her testimony seemed overly vague,
dramatic and exaggerated considering the objective medical findings, and she needed
much prompting and leading by her representative.” (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at
24-25.) The ALJ further reviewed the medical findings of three physicians who examined
Johnson and provided opinions contradictory to her testimony. Finally, the ALJ
concluded that Johnson was not disabled because her impairments are “not attended,
singly or in combination, with the specific clinical signs and diagnostic findings required
to meet or equal the requirements set forth in the Listings of Impairments ... . In this
regard we note that no treating or examining physician has mentioned findings equivalent
in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment.” (A.R. at 20.)
With respect to Listing 1.04, we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Johnson’s impairments do not meet or equal
6

the criteria in Listing 1.04.4 In Jones, we emphasized that “‘[f]or a claimant to show his
impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An
impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not
qualify.’” Id. at 504 (quoting Sullivan v. Zelby, 439 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in
original)). Although Johnson’s impairments exhibit some of the specified medical
criteria, as the District Court noted, there is substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s
conclusion that her impairments fail to satisfy the entire set of criteria in 1.04 because
there is no evidence of motor loss to satisfy Listing 1.04A, no evidence of spinal
arachnoiditis to satisfy Listing 1.04B, and contradictory evidence regarding an inability to
ambulate effectively, which is required to satisfy Listing 1.04C. Furthermore, only one of
three physicians who examined Johnson opined that she was disabled.5 Therefore, the
District Court was correct in concluding that the ALJ’s finding was supported by
substantial evidence.
B.

ALJ’s Evidentiary Basis for Assessment of Johnson’s Residual
Functional Capacity

Johnson argues that the ALJ failed to provide an evidentiary basis for his
conclusion that Johnson “retains the residual functional capacity to lift and carry up to
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Johnson does not argue that the ALJ erred in finding that her impairments do not meet
or equal the criteria established in Listing 11.00 ff.
5

Although Dr. Glastein stated that Johnson was permanently disabled, Dr. Bagner
found that his objective findings did not correlate with her need for a cane or subjective
difficulties, and Dr. Patashnik concluded that she was not in acute distress and was only
limited in activities requiring prolonged walking, standing, repetitive bending, and lifting.
7

twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, sit for six hours and stand and/or
walk for two hours in an eight hour workday, and occasionally climb stairs, balance,
kneel, crouch, crawl or stoop.” (A.R. at 28.) We disagree. In his analysis of the medical
evidence, the ALJ stated that he rejected Dr. Glastein’s conclusion that Johnson was
permanently disabled because it contradicted the preponderance of the evidence.6 Dr.
Banger noted in 2000 that Johnson did not use a cane or crutches, was able to dress and
undress herself, was not uncomfortable while seated, experienced no motor abnormality,
and had normal range of motion in her shoulders, elbows, forearms, wrists, hips, knees,
and ankles. In 2002, Johnson told Dr. Potashnik that she could take care of her personal
needs, drive her car, and walk two blocks before resting. Furthermore, during Dr.
Patashnik’s examination, she could dress and undress without assistance, get on and off
the examination table without difficulty, successfully toe-and- heel walk, and demonstrate
full range of motion. She was only found to be limited with respect to prolonged walking
and standing.
The ALJ considered two state agency physicians’ determinations in 2000 and 2001
that Johnson could occasionally lift and carry twenty pounds, frequently lift and carry ten
pounds, stand and walk six hours, sit six hours in an eight-hour work day, and
occasionally climb stairs or ramps, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Dr. Banger
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The ALJ also stated that he accorded “little weight” to Dr. Glastein’s opinion because
Dr. Glastein failed to distinguish between Johnson’s symptoms from two recent car
accidents and her persistent symptoms from the alleged degenerative disease.
8

agreed with these findings in 2004, only differing in that he believed Johnson could sit for
an unlimited period of time and stand and walk at least two hours in an eight-hour
workday. Because the ALJ’s conclusions regarding Johnson’s residual functional
capacity are supported by substantial evidence in the record, we affirm the decision of the
District Court.
C.

Johnson’s Subjective Complaints

Johnson maintains that the ALJ failed to accord serious consideration to her
subjective complaints of pain, and thus, violated the Commissioner’s “pain protocol.”
The ALJ, however, specifically recognized Johnson’s subjective complaints in his
opinion, and concluded that her testimony was vague, exaggerated, coached, and contrary
to the medical evidence in the record.7 The ALJ provided a thorough analysis of the
medical evidence in the record and rendered a decision that, while contrary to Dr.
Glastein’s opinion, was based upon evidence found in the reports of the other physicians
who examined Johnson. See Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The ALJ
must review all the medical findings and other evidence presented in support of the
attending physician’s opinion of total disability. In doing so, the ALJ must weigh the

7

This conclusion was supported by Dr. Banger’s opinion that Johnson’s subjective
complaints failed to correlate with his objective findings that Johnson had full range of
motion, was not uncomfortable while seated, and had no atrophy in the muscles in her
lower extremities. It was also supported by Dr. Glastein’s opinion that Johnson’s lumbar
decompression and spinal fusion were successful, and that home exercises could be used
to treat any persistent neck and back pain. Finally, the ALJ noted that Johnson herself
testified that over-the-counter pain medications were effective in relieving her pain.
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relative worth of a treating physician’s report against the reports submitted by other
physicians who have examined the claimant.”) (citations omitted). In light of the above
facts, we hold that the District Court was correct in deciding that substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s decision.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court entered on

September 1, 2006 will be affirmed.
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